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DEMOCRATIZING CRIMINAL LAW:
FEASIBILITY, UTILITY, AND THE CHALLENGE
OF SOCIAL CHANGE
Paul H. Robinson
ABSTRACT—There are good reasons to be initially hesitant about shaping
criminal law rules to track the justice judgments of ordinary people. People
seem to disagree about many criminal law issues. Their judgments, at least
as reflected in many aspects of current law such as three strikes and high
penalties for drug offenses, seem harsh to many. Effective crime control
would seem to require the expertise of trained experts and scholars who
understand the complexities of general deterrence and the identification and
incapacitation of the dangerous.
But this brief Essay, which reviews some previous studies and
analyses, argues that distributing criminal liability and punishment
according to the shared judgments of the community—so-called “empirical
desert”—does not have the failings that many assume, such as those
described above, and indeed ought to be preferred by both moral
philosophers and crime-control utilitarians. It represents the best practical
approximation of deontological desert. And it offers the greatest potential
for effective crime control because, by tracking community views, the
criminal law can build its moral credibility with the community and thereby
harness the potentially enormous powers of social influence and
internalized norms.
AUTHOR—Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania
Law School. Many thanks to Joshua Kleinfeld, Rick Bierschbach, and the
editors of the Northwestern University Law Review.
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INTRODUCTION
The notion of “democratizing criminal law” has an initial appeal
because, after all, we believe in the importance of democracy and because
criminal law is so important—it protects us from the most egregious
wrongs and is the vehicle by which we allow the most serious
governmental intrusions in the lives of individuals. Given criminal law’s
special status, isn’t it appropriate that this most important and most
intrusive governmental power be subject to the constraints of democratic
determination?
But perhaps the initial appeal of this grand principle must give way to
practical realities. As much as we are devoted to democratic ideals, perhaps
the path to a better society is one that must recognize inherent weaknesses
in the system of democratic action, which necessarily relies upon the
judgments of common people. Perhaps, when dealing with things as
important as doing justice and preventing crime, we must look instead to
experts, such as criminologists and moral philosophers. Perhaps the path to
a better society is one that, in this instance, should skirt democratic
preferences as needed?
More specifically, consider some of the realities that might derail a
movement toward democratizing criminal law. First, perhaps there is no
such thing as a shared community view of justice on which to base a
system of criminal law, but simply an endless list of individual
disagreements. There can be no such thing as a criminal code that reflects
community views if there is no such thing as a shared community view.
Second, even if there were a shared community sense of justice, perhaps
that view is something born of anger and suspicion, brutish and draconian,
and something that even the people themselves feel should not be publicly
enshrined in principles of liability and punishment. Third, even if
community views of justice are in fact enlightened, perhaps they do not
achieve a more pervasive goal of reducing crime. That is, perhaps the path
to effective crime control is not through justice—either the community’s
1566
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view of it or the moral philosopher’s view—but through more
instrumentalist crime-control mechanisms, such as general deterrence or
incapacitation of the dangerous. And finally, even if relying upon the
community’s views of justice was an effective crime-control mechanism,
wouldn’t such a system condemn us to live under the status quo of current
community views? History teaches us that a society can improve itself and
the lives of its members only by moving ever forward in refining its
judgments of justice.
Thus, this brief Essay will take up these four questions: (1) Is there
any such thing as the community’s views of justice? (2) Are the
community’s views of justice brutish and draconian? (3) Why should a
criminal law concerned with crime-control care what the community thinks
is just? (4) Should criminal law ever deviate from the community’s shared
judgments of justice?
IS THERE ANY SUCH THING AS THE COMMUNITY’S VIEWS OF JUSTICE?

I.

Given the subjective and complex nature of judgments about justice,
one would expect disagreement among people. But the research suggests
otherwise. It shows a high degree of agreement about judgments of justice
across all demographics, at least for what one might call the core of
wrongdoing—physical aggression, taking property without consent, and
deceit in exchanges. As potential crimes move out from this core, the
judgments become culturally dependent, and thus more diverse.1
The high level of agreement seen is not agreement on the exact
punishment that should be imposed in any particular case, but rather is
agreement on the relative blameworthiness of different offenders, a rankordering of cases according to the punishment they deserve. People and
societies will disagree about the severity of punishment to impose.
Different people may want to set a different high-end point on the
punishment continuum. Some may set the high-end point as the death
penalty; others may set it at life imprisonment, while still others may set it
at ten years’ imprisonment. The high-end point is a culturally dependent
determination and is thus malleable. But once the high-end point is set, as it
must be in every society, people commonly will agree where on the
punishment continuum a given case falls for the amount of punishment
deserved.

1

For a more detailed discussion of these issues and the studies cited infra notes 2–6, see PAUL H.
ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT ch. 2 (2013) [hereinafter ROBINSON,
IJUD].
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In one study, for example, subjects were asked to rank order twentyfour scenarios describing a criminal event according to their proper level of
punishment. Each story described a particular course of potentially
wrongful conduct for a wide range of offenses, from minor assault or theft
to serious wrongdoing such as robbery or murder. The results showed that
essentially all subjects ranked the twenty-four scenarios the same, with
agreement across all demographics. That is, the results were not affected by
the subject’s gender, age, level of education, political views, race, marital
status, religion, income, or any other typically influential demographic.
Strikingly, the level of agreement measured by Kendall’s W (a
coefficient of concordance in which 1.0 means perfect agreement) was 0.95
among subjects tested in person and 0.88 among subjects tested on the
internet. As a point of comparison, in a study of American men ranking the
beauty of women with different waist-to-hip ratios, the researchers found a
Kendall’s W of 0.54.2 A study of travel magazine readers ranking
destinations by danger of terrorism found a Kendall’s W of 0.52.3
Economists ranking the top twenty economic journals by quality had a
Kendall’s W of 0.095.4
Indeed, to get a Kendall’s W as high as this judgments-of-justice
study, one must look to what are close to pure perceptual tasks. For
example, in one study, subjects were asked to judge the overall relative
brightness of different clusters of differently shaded dots. Subjects
generally agreed in their rankings, with a Kendall’s W of 0.95.5 In another
study, researchers tested the seven faces you see below, showing different
levels of discomfort. These are the faces used by doctors to get pain level
information from patients who are too young to speak, or who do not speak
the doctor’s language. Subjects typically agreed when asked to rank the
images according to the amount of pain they showed, with a Kendall’s W
of 0.97.6

2

Frank Marlowe & Adam Wetsman, Preferred Waist-to-Hip Ratio and Ecology, 30 PERSONALITY
& INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 481, 483 (2001).
3
Baruch Fischhoff, Wändi Bruine De Bruin, Wendy Perrin & Julie Downs, Travel Risks in a Time
of Terror: Judgments and Choices, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1301, 1303 (2004).
4
Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: An Analysis of Journal
Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 1402, 1421–22 (2003).
5
Charles M M de Weert & Noud A W H van Kruysbergen, Assimilation: Central and Peripheral
Effects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1221 (1997).
6
Keela A. Herr, Paula R. Mobily, Frank J. Kohout & Diane Wagenaar, Evaluation of the Faces
Pain Scale for Use with the Elderly, 14:1 CLINICAL J. PAIN 29, 29 (1998),
http://journals.lww.com/pain/fulltext/10.1016/0304-3959(90)90018-9. Figure 1, also known as the
Faces Pain Scale, originated in a 1990 study. Davia Bieri, Robert A. Reeve, G. David Champion,
Louise Addicoat & John B. Ziegler, The Faces Pain Scale for the Assessment of the Severity of Pain
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FIGURE 1

Important here is the fact that there is not an infinite number of
meaningfully different points on a punishment continuum. The
meaningfully different punishment units become larger as the punishment
amount increases. The difference between sentences of three days and
seven days is meaningful to people, but the difference between a sentence
of ten years and three days versus ten years and seven days is not seen as
meaningful different. The higher on the punishment continuum, the larger
the meaningful punishment units. Thus, the number of meaningfully
different punishment units on the punishment continuum is limited.
Yet, the number of cases that people will see as meaningfully different
in the punishment deserved is very high. That is, each case requires a
specific amount of punishment, not just a general range of punishment.
There is not some magical connection between an offense and an amount
of punishment. Rather, the specific amount of punishment required is an
amount of punishment that will put that offense in its proper ordinal rank.
This helps explain why it has taken us so long to discover the high
level of agreement on the relative seriousness of different core wrongs.
People’s disagreements about general severity of punishment—such as
their disagreement about the proper high-end point of the punishment
continuum—obscured
their
common
agreement
on
relative
blameworthiness.7
People commonly have a quick answer to such questions as “Should
someone be punished for what they have done?” and “If so, what is the
relative blameworthiness of this offender and offense as compared to other
offenses?” The answers could be the result of reasoning—thinking
carefully through the issue and applying some set of principles. However,
for many, these answers are intuitional rather than reasoned. That is, these
answers come to them without logically thinking through steps in applying
principles. Instead, they arrive at an answer almost as if they were
observing it as a fact.
As the Kahneman graphic depicts below, intuitions have much in
common with pure perception. Intuitions produce answers that are fast,
Experienced by Children: Development, Initial Validation, and Preliminary Investigation for Ratio
Scale Properties, 41:2 PAIN 139, 144 (1990), http://journals.lww.com/clinicalpain/toc/1998/03000.
7
For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
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automatic, and effortless. The speed of intuitions is quite different from the
speed of reasoning, which tends to be slow, controlled, and effortful. What
is so striking, and so interesting, about intuitions is that unlike perceptions,
which typically deal with very simple, objective things, intuitions can
concern complex and conceptual things, which typically are the subject of
reasoning.8
FIGURE 2

Intuitions of justice are a good example. Judgments about justice seem
complex and subtle, yet when they are intuitional, people arrive at them
quickly and effortlessly. Further, people have no access to why they came
to an intuitive conclusion. Unlike a reasoned conclusion, where they
understand and remember the series of steps that brought them to that
conclusion, intuitions seem obvious to them—so obvious as to not require
an explanation. Educated people in particular, who might pride themselves
on being rational, will commonly make up reasons after the fact to explain
and give the appearance of rationality to their intuitive judgments. But
these reasons are not how they reached their respective intuitive
conclusions; they are only an attempt to justify them.9
What is perhaps most striking about people’s justice judgments is that
they are quite nuanced and sophisticated. Small changes in facts can
produce large and predictable changes in liability judgments. Yet

8

Figure 2 was originally produced in Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice
Mapping Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 698 (2003). Reprinted with permission
from the American Psychological Association (APA). For a more detailed discussion of these issues,
see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 6–7.
9
For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
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sophistication does not depend upon education, intelligence, or upon other
demographic factors. Research has repeatedly shown this to be true in a
wide range of criminal law contexts. Examples of this are found in the
following areas: the objective requirements of complicity; attempt;
causation; offense culpability doctrines such as mistake, accident,
voluntary intoxication, and the partial individualization of the reasonable
person standard for negligence; justification doctrines such as defensive
force and law enforcement use of force; culpability requirements; excuse
doctrines such as insanity, immaturity, involuntary intoxication, duress, and
entrapment; grading doctrines such as those relating to sexual offenses and
homicide offenses; testing empirical claims of theoretical literature; and
using individualized judgments to test competing scholarly theories, such
as the nature of justification defenses, blackmail, and the nature of the shift
from common law to modern penal codes.10
This picture of laypersons’ judgments of justice—high levels of
agreement on the relative blameworthiness of many aspects of the core
wrongdoing, the apparently intuitional nature of many aspects of these
judgments, and the high level of nuance and sophistication—may seem a
bit puzzling. What can possibly explain why we are built this way?
One theory, supported by a good deal of evidence, suggests that this
aspect of human nature results from pressures of evolutionary
development. Early human groups on the Serengeti Plain were surrounded
by bigger, faster, and stronger predators. What saved them—what made
humans the most successful species in the history of the planet—was the
ability they developed for cooperative action. To maintain cooperative
action, a group must have certain foundational rules of conduct among
members. The “core of wrongdoing” so universally agreed upon across
demographics seems a good candidate for these foundational rules: no
physical aggression against other group members, no taking of another’s
property without consent, and no deceit in exchanges. To allow such
victimization would be to risk undermining the cooperation of the group
member being victimized.
But the rules mean nothing without enforcement, so a system of
punishment for violating the foundational rules must exist to maintain a
desired level of cooperation. Complicating things is the fact that the only
available methods of punishment seem themselves to be violations of the
basic prohibitions: beating a violator, or taking his possessions, or
depriving him of his share of the group’s food. Thus, the group members
had to appreciate the existence and special status of punishment for
10

For more details, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, and infra Parts III–IV.
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violation, and to develop some kind of shared understanding of what
constituted a violation and what constituted appropriate punishment for it.
The propriety of punishing wrongdoing and the notion of proportionality
between the seriousness of the violation and the seriousness of the
punishment are the foundational principles upon which laypersons of today
tend to agree. It would seem to fit nicely with the demands of the
punishment system among the early human groups on the Serengeti Plain.
The groups that can develop and maintain such shared understandings can
most effectively maintain their cooperative nature and will flourish. The
groups that cannot do so will lose their cooperative nature and die out.11
Humans are not the animals who created the notion of cooperative
action, the institution of punishment, and the principle of proportionality.
Rather, the 125,000 generations of humans were simply building on the
foundation of those principles established by their evolutionary ancestors.
More rudimentary forms of the same notions can be seen in the conduct of
many animal species, especially those that show cooperative social
structures.12 Also support for the notion of a partially innate human
predisposition toward these principles is found in the child development
literature. Most striking here is that social scientists can identify a
predictable pattern of moral development that is quite detailed—predicting
specific stages of development at specific ages—that is seen in every
known human society on the planet and is immune to demographic
differences.13
Given the enormous influence of one’s life experience, be it one’s
culture, gender, education, socioeconomic status, race, religion, or any
number of other influential demographic variables, how could it be that
despite these dramatic differences there can exist such human universals?
That such universals do exist illustrates the power of their influence and
supports the notion that there is a partially innate human predisposition at
work. That predisposition no doubt can play out in different ways—
conditions of starvation, as opposed to conditions allowing one to earn a
Ph.D. in economics, may influence how the predisposition develops—but
there is every reason to believe that there exists a shared core that is part of
the human character.
Interestingly, we see common patterns of conduct and attitudes in
relation to judgments of justice even in the most extreme situations.
11

For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 36–41.
For a more detailed discussion, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at ch. 3. For a more popular
presentation of these issues, see PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND
LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW chs. 2–4 (2015).
13
For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 48–54.
12
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Examining a host of natural experiments over the past century or two in
which human groups were thrust into a situation where government and
law could no longer have an effect on them, we still see evidence of the
human predisposition toward shared views of wrongdoing and punishment
across a staggeringly varied set of absent-law situations. These natural
experiments include plane crashes, shipwrecks, forced leper colonies, goldmining camps, pirate colonies, inmates in prison camps, prisoners after an
uprising, residents of occupied territory in war, and a host of other absentlaw situations.14
All of this is not to suggest that there is agreement on all criminal
liability and punishment rules. There is not. As noted above, while people
may agree on the relative seriousness of many aspects of core
wrongdoings, they disagree on other issues. Also, the further out from the
core, the greater disagreement can be. Further out from the core, the
ultimate judgment increasingly depends upon a larger measure of reasoned
judgment extrapolating from an initial intuition, and is more influenced by
cultural or other demographic variables. But the larger point is that,
contrary to the once common wisdom, justice judgments are not all matters
on which everyone disagrees about everything. Some universal principles
do exist, which means that one can reasonably speak of a core of a
“community view.”
In my discussion of the third question of this Essay, I will come back
to the issue of the existence of disagreements on some issues. The
significance of points of disagreement depends in part upon whether and
why one cares about community views in the first place.
Assuming that there is a community view of justice, if we are to move
beyond academic discussion to the practical realities of lawmaking, we
must face the possibility that different communities have somewhat
different views on some criminal law matters. Thus, we must be able to
answer the question, “Which community?” But the answer to that is simple,
even obvious: the relevant community is that which will be bound by the
rule being enacted. If the issue is how to construct a state criminal code,
then the relevant community is the residents of that state. If the issue is the
provision of a municipal code, the relevant population is the residents of
that city. If the issue arises in the federal criminal code, the relevant
population is all U.S. residents.
To summarize, research suggests there is a high degree of agreement
among people at least in regard to crimes that are the core of wrongdoing.
In addition, while people may disagree as to the exact punishment that
14

See generally ROBINSON & ROBINSON, PIRATES, supra note 12.
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should be imposed, they generally agree as to the relative severity of
punishment that should be given based on the relative severity of the
offense. Therefore, it seems at least a colorable community view of justice
exists. This brings us to our second question, which is whether this
community view of justice may be draconian and brutish.
II.

ARE THE COMMUNITY’S VIEWS OF JUSTICE
BRUTISH AND DRACONIAN?

One might conclude that there is such a thing as the community view
of justice yet be appalled at the notion that a society should give deference
to this view given the practical evidence on display about where such
deference would take us. Consider some of the politically popular criminal
law doctrines common in the United States: (1) the “three strikes” statutes,
which can provide long prison terms for an offender who has previous
criminal convictions, (2) high penalties for drug-related offenses, (3) rules
reducing the age at which an offender can be prosecuted as an adult, (4)
rules narrowing or eliminating the insanity defense, (5) the use of “strict
liability” offenses, which do not require that the offender had a culpable
state of mind toward the conduct and circumstances of the offense, and (6)
the “felony murder rule,” which provides that anyone causing a death even
accidentally during the commission of a felony is liable for murder, the
most serious form of homicide otherwise reserved for intentional killings.
It may be no surprise that people commonly assume that such criminal
law doctrines reflect community views, given that we are living in a
democracy. But that assumption turns out to be wrong. Consider a recent
study that tested laypersons’ judgments of justice on the six illustrative
doctrines listed above. Subjects were given a dozen “milestone scenarios”
that previous testing had shown represented the full spectrum of relative
blameworthiness. These scenarios presented cases from something as
trivial as mistakenly taking another person’s umbrella at a restaurant to
intentionally killing another person in an ambush. Subjects were also given
a dozen scenarios, each based on a real-world case, that involve one of the
six crime-control doctrines above. Those “crime-control scenarios” are
summarized on the table below.15

15

This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 123. For additional information
on this study, see Paul Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (2010).
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TABLE 1

Scenario

Case Name

Offense

Crime-Control
Doctrine

Actual Court
Sentence

L. Accidental
teacher shooting

Brazill

Murder

Adult Prosecution
of Juveniles

28 years w/o
parole

K. Drowning
children to save
them from hell

Yates

Murder

Narrowing
Insanity Defense

life

J. Accomplice
killing during
burglary

Moore

Felony murder,
burglary

Felony Murder

life at hard labor
w/o parole

I. Killing officer
believed to be
alien

Clark

Murder

Narrowing
Insanity Defense

life

Heacock

Felony murder,
unlawful
distribution of
controlled
substance

Felony Murder

40 years

G. Cocaine in
trunk

Harmelin

Complicity in
unlawful
distribution of
controlled
substance

Drug Offense
Penalties

life w/o parole

F. Air conditioner
fraud

Rummel

Petty fraud

Three Strikes

life w/o parole

E. Sex with female
reasonably
believed overage

Haas

Statutory rape

Strict Liability

40 to 60 years

D. Underage sex
by mentally
retarded man

Garnett

Statutory rape

Strict Liability

5 years

C. Marijuana
unloading

Papa

Unlawful
possession of
controlled
substance

Drug Offense
Penalties

8 years

B. Shooting of TV

Almond

Unlawfully
discharging
firearm

Three Strikes

15 years w/o
parole

A. Incorrect
lobster container

Blandford

Violation of
importation
regulations

Criminalizing
Regulatory
Violations

15 years to life

H. Cocaine
overdose
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Subjects were asked to rank order all two dozen cases and to give an
appropriate sentence to each. The results are summarized in Table 2
below.16 The numbered cases on the left-hand margin are the milestone
scenarios. The indented and lettered italicized cases are the crime-control
scenarios.
TABLE 2
Scenario
12. Ambush shooting
11. Stabbing
10. Accidental mauling by pit bulls

Subjects’ Mean
Sentence

Actual Court
Sentence

between life and
death
essentially life
20.6 years

L. Accidental teacher shooting (juvenile)

19.2 years

28 years w/o
parole

K. Drowning children to save them from hell
(insanity)

26.3 years

life

J. Accomplice killing during burglary (felony
murder)

17.7 years

life at hard labor
w/o parole

9. Clubbing during robbery
8. Attempted robbery at gas station

12.0 years
9.1 years

I. Killing officer believed to be alien (insanity)

16.5 years

life

H. Cocaine overdose (felony murder)

10.7 years

40 years

7. Stitches after soccer game

5.0 years

6. Slap and bruising at record store

3.9 years

G. Cocaine in trunk (drugs)

4.2 years

life w/o parole

F. Air conditioner fraud (three strikes)

3.1 years

life w/o parole

5. Microwave from house
E. Sex with female reasonably believed overage
(strict liability)
4. Clock radio from car

2.3 years
2.9 years

40 to 60 years

1.9 years

D. Underage sex by mentally retarded man (strict
liability)

2.3 years

C. Marijuana unloading (drugs)

1.9 years

8 years

1.1 years

15 years w/o
parole

B. Shooting of TV (three strikes)
3. Whole pies from buffet
A. Incorrect lobster container (regulatory)

8.3 months
9.7 months

2. Wolf hallucination

1.1 years

1. Umbrella mistake

1.8 months

16

5 years

15 years to life

This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 125. For additional information
about this study, see Robinson et al., supra note 15.
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Below is a more graphic presentation of the information in Table 2.17
The cases on the left of the graphic are the milestone scenarios, which
provide points of comparison along the full length of the punishment
continuum. The lines from each case to the punishment scale show how
severely the lay persons would punish each of these milestone offenses.
On the right are the cases illustrating the six common crime-control
doctrines described above. The solid lines on the right show the amount of
punishment that the study’s subjects would impose in each case. The dotted
lines show what punishment the law would impose, and did actually
impose in the case. As you see, the law’s punishment is dramatically higher
than that of the study’s subjects. The difference is even more striking when
you take into account that the punishment continuum used here is
exponential. That is, moving from ❶ to ❷ triples the punishment (from
two months to six months), just as moving from ❸ to ❹ triples the
punishment (from one year to three years). Thus, the large difference
between the solid lines and the dotted lines for each case shows that the
punishment the law imposes is commonly many times more severe than
what the study’s subjects would impose.
FIGURE 3

17

This figure is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 127, and Robinson et al., supra
note 15, at 1973.

1577

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

How could such a discrepancy occur in a democracy, where the laws
are enacted by elected representatives of the people? The underlying causes
of this phenomena are the operation of crime politics in the United States.
First, politicians have been persuaded—often by academics—that they
should focus on crime control without regard to its effect on deserved
punishment. And second, politicians frequently use criminal law legislation
for their own political purposes, rather than to do justice or prevent crime.18
Many amendments and new offenses are enacted to show constituents their
concern for some headline issue. However, we cannot be too critical here.
Politicians are simply trying to be responsive to their community—
normally something we see as a good thing, and usually a positive feature
of democracy.
But in many instances, “the problem” about which some constituents
or the local newspaper headlines are concerned has little to do with a flaw
in an existing criminal law. Not every problem can be fixed with a criminal
code amendment. People will continue to commit outrageous crimes,
judges will continue to make what are seen as sentencing errors, and so on.
Yet, legislators often feel a need to do something to show that they are
sensitive to their constituents’ concerns. And there are few “somethings”
that they can do. Changing or adding to the criminal law is one of the few
things available. But when crime legislation is simply a vehicle for
expressing concern, drafters have few ways to assure that their legislation
in fact improves rather than degrades criminal law, and justice, in the
longer term.
Unfortunately, criminal law bills, even if useless and unnecessary,
commonly pass because legislators commonly share a reluctance to appear
“soft on crime.” When a new and unnecessary offense, say “library theft,”
is proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on whether legislators care
about public libraries, not on whether the proposed legislation will actually
do anything new to combat the problem of such theft, or on whether it will
instead have pernicious ramifications for the application of the criminal
code’s general theft provision. A legislator is likely to vote in favor of the
library-theft bill because there is a clear constituency—library users and
taxpayers—who would seem to share a concern about library theft, and no
constituency to complain about the new provision’s less obvious and more
diffuse drawbacks in creating inconsistencies, ambiguities, and overlaps.

18

For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The
Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2005); Paul H.
Robinson, The Rise and Fall and Resurrection of American Criminal Codes, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
173 (2015).
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Another sort of systemic problem might be called “punishment
inflation.” In order to emphasize how seriously the legislators take the new
offense they have created, the heat of the moment naturally pushes the
grade of the offense higher than it might otherwise be. A year or two later,
when that heat has died down, the grade may seem inconsistent with other
offenses, but the exaggerated grade lives on.
Worse, the dynamic creates a vicious cycle. Having exaggerated the
grade of yesterday’s “crime du jour,” the legislator, in order to adequately
express outrage over today’s crime du jour, must exceed the new,
exaggerated baseline established by yesterday’s offense. The ultimate
effect is to create an upward spiral of grading, and a hodge-podge of
inconsistent offense grades. There is no fixing this problem ad hoc. Internal
grading consistency within a code requires examining all of its offense and
suboffense grades at one time, comparing each against the grade of every
other.
We see this unhealthy dynamic in every state that we have
investigated.19 In Kentucky, for example, a relatively thoughtful criminal
law reformer among the states, it is estimated that there are now 440
provisions in the criminal code and 1800 criminal offenses outside of the
code. This is a dramatic increase over what existed when the new
comprehensive criminal code was enacted in 1974. Yet new forms of
criminal activity that did not exist in 1974 make up only a trivial number of
these new offenses.20
It is possible to recodify current American criminal codes to better
reflect the community’s true judgments of justice and to better maintain
that correspondence in the future.21 But the larger point here is that the
19

See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., REPORT OF THE DELAWARE CRIMINAL LAW
RECODIFICATION PROJECT (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2950728
[https://perma.cc/9FFM-U8MA]; PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE MALDIVES PENAL
LAW AND SENTENCING CODIFICATION PROJECT (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522222 [https://
perma.cc/XT5A-KHS4]; PAUL H. ROBINSON, FINAL REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY PENAL CODE
REVISION PROJECT (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1523384 [https://perma.cc/3EDQ-B42B]; PAUL H.
ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND
REFORM
COMMISSION
(2003),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1290&context=faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/PK3C-83WW].
20
Robinson & Cahill, supra note 18, at 635–37.
21
For a discussion of the kinds of reforms one could make to the criminal law amendment process,
see Robinson, Resurrection, supra note 18, at 182–90. For examples of how studies exposing grading
irrationalities can be conducted, see Paul H. Robinson, Thomas Gaeta, Matthew Majarian, Megan
Schultz & Douglas M. Weck, The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical
Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709 (2010); PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL.,
REPORT ON OFFENSE GRADING IN NEW JERSEY (2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1737825
[https://perma.cc/HBP8-ABRJ]; PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., REPORT ON OFFENSE GRADING IN
PENNSYLVANIA (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1527149 [https://perma.cc/969P-9JMU].
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unjust nature of today’s popular crime-control doctrines is not a product of
the community’s judgments of justice but rather is seriously in conflict with
them. Those doctrines are more often than not the product of crime-control
strategies such as general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous
that ignore community judgments of justice (and have been aided and
abetted by many of the academics who now complain about the injustice of
current law resulting from such crime-control principles). A criminal law
built upon lay people’s judgments of justice would be dramatically more
attentive to tying criminal liability and punishment to an offender’s true
blameworthiness. As I have argued elsewhere,22 the theory of empirical
desert, which calls for having criminal law rules reflect community shared
judgments of justice, produces the best practical approximation of true
justice.23
To summarize, although it may seem that community views on
punishment are draconian or brutish, in reality, those views are rooted
soundly in principles of proportionality and in fact seriously conflict with
the harsh and disproportionate penalties found in many modern crimecontrol doctrines. That discrepancy is not the result of draconian
community views but rather the result of academically inspired crimecontrol doctrines and the dysfunction of American crime politics. This
brings us to our third question, which asks whether a criminal law
concerned with effective crime control should care what communities think
is just.
III.

WHY SHOULD THE CRIMINAL LAW CARE WHAT THE
COMMUNITY THINKS IS JUST?

Given what we know about people’s intuitions of justice, is there any
reason that the criminal law should care about them? Should criminal law
set its liability and punishment rules to track the justice judgments of the
community it governs? I believe that the answer to these questions is yes.
The general line of argument is this: by having criminal law adopt liability
and punishment rules that track community views, it can enhance criminal
law’s “moral credibility” for doing justice with the community it governs,
and that increased moral authority can have strong practical crime-control
benefits in avoiding resistance and subversion and in gaining deference,
cooperation, normative influence, and ultimately compliance.

22

Paul H. Robinson, Joshua Samuel Barton & Matthew Lister, Empirical Desert, Individual
Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312 (2014).
23
PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED
HOW MUCH? ch. 8 (2008).
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History certainly suggests such a dynamic, at least for dramatic levels
of disrespect for the criminal law. The early Soviet criminal justice system
was notoriously arbitrary and corrupt, with little or no moral credibility
among the general population. Any compliance it gained was through
coercion or brutality by the extensive police power. When those power
centers weakened with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crime rate
increased dramatically. It was only the coercive influence of the state’s
threat that gave the system effect, and once that was gone, so too went its
control.
But some previous empirical studies have hinted, and more recent
studies have confirmed, that this same relationship between the criminal
justice system’s moral credibility and its ability to gain deference and
compliance applies not just to extreme cases but to all—that there is a
general relationship between the system’s moral credibility and its ability
to gain compliance.24 Even a marginal decrease in the former will produce a
marginal decrease in the latter. This suggests that any system can improve
its ability to gain deference and compliance by improving its reputation for
doing justice and avoiding injustice.
Why should this be so? Why should undermining the criminal law’s
moral credibility have the effect of undermining the system’s crime-control
effectiveness? Let me suggest four mechanisms by which this can occur.
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially
enormous. A criminal law that has earned moral credibility with the people
can harness these powerful social and normative forces through a variety of
mechanisms. First, a criminal law with moral credibility can harness the
power of stigmatization. Many people will avoid breaking the law if doing
so will stigmatize them, and thereby endanger their personal and social
relationships. The power of stigmatization is cheap—it does not have the
cost of imprisonment, for example—and it exists even if the threat of
official sanction is not present; it is enough that friends or acquaintances
might learn of the misconduct. A criminal law that regularly punishes
conduct seen as blameless, or at least not deserving the condemnation of
criminal liability, will be unable to harness the power of stigmatization.
Second, a system that has earned moral credibility with the people
also can help avoid vigilantism. People will be less likely to take matters
into their own hands if they have confidence that the system is trying hard
to do justice. And, as I detail elsewhere, the danger of vigilantism goes
beyond those rare souls willing to “go into the streets”; it includes “shadow
vigilantes” who try to force justice from a system apparently reluctant to do
24

For a discussion of these issues, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 176–88.
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it—normally law-abiding citizens and officials who see the system’s
failures of justice as justifying their distortion of the criminal justice
process. Examples of such “vigilantism” include police “testilying” and
jury nullification, which may acquit excessive use of force against
aggressors.25
Third, a reputation for moral credibility can avoid provoking the kind
of resistance and subversion that we see in criminal justice systems with
poor reputations. Such resistance and subversion can appear among any of
the participants in the system. Do victims report offenses? Do potential
witnesses come forward to help police and investigators? Do police,
investigators, prosecutors, and judges follow the legal rules, or do they feel
free to make up their own? In systems with trial juries, do the jurors follow
their legal instructions or do they make up their own rules? Do offenders
acquiesce in their liability and punishment, or do they focus instead on
thinking an injustice has been done to them?
Finally, the most powerful force that comes from a criminal justice
system with moral credibility is its power to shape and reinforce societal
norms, and to cause people to internalize those norms. If the criminal law
has earned a reputation for doing justice, then when the law criminalizes
some new form of conduct or makes some conduct a more serious offense
than it had previously been, the community takes this legal action as
reliable evidence that the conduct really is more condemnable.26
The forces of social influence and internalized norms are potentially
enormous. But if the criminal law conflicts with people’s judgments of
justice, that conflict will undermine law’s moral credibility and thereby
undermine criminal law’s ability to harness these forces.
Let me show the results of just one recent study about this dynamic
between the system’s moral credibility, and its ability to gain compliance.
Subjects were tested to determine their views on a variety of issues related
to whether they would defer to the demands of the criminal law, or help
investigators, or report an offense, or take criminalization to mean that the
conduct really was more morally condemnable, and so on—setting a
baseline for each of the specific mechanisms of potential influence
described above. The subjects were then told of a variety of real-world
cases in which the criminal justice system had done serious injustice or
failed to do justice, not by accident but as the result of legal liability rules
formally adopted with the knowledge that they would produce results of
25

See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & SARAH M. ROBINSON, THE VIGILANTE ECHO: HOW
FAILURES OF JUSTICE INSPIRE LAWLESSNESS (2017).
26
For a more detailed discussion of these mechanisms, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 152–
63.
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which the community would disapprove. After this disillusioning
information, the subjects were tested again and their views on the measures
of deference and compliance had all weakened. Both sets of questions used
a nine-point scale where the higher the number, the greater the deference to
the criminal law and willingness to comply with it. Here are the results27:
TABLE 3: WITHIN-SUBJECTS DISILLUSIONMENT STUDY
Question
1. Life sentence means offense conduct must be
heinous
2. Law prohibition means posting false
comments must be condemnable
3. High sentence for financial maneuver means
condemnable

Baseline
Avg.

Post-Stimulation Avg.

Significance

6.46

5.14

p < .001

6.14

5.76

p < .07

5.25

4.63

p < .02

4. Report removal of arrowhead

5.93

5.14

p < .01

5. Give found handgun to police

6.66

5.56

p < .001

6. Report dog violation to authorities

5.15

4.59

p < .01

7. Go back and report your mistake to gas station

7.05

5.69

p < .001

8. Go back and report your mistake to restaurant

7.15

5.71

p < .001

The graphic on the next page gives a visual display of this same
information. The patterned bars show the subjects’ responses before the
disillusionment, and the gray bars after.

27

This table is reproduced from ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 180. The first column lists not
the full text of the questions used but rather a short-hand identification of the questions.
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FIGURE 4

For all eight questions, deference to the criminal law decreased after
the disillusioning stimuli. This is actually a quite surprising result, if you
think about it. When adult subjects are tested in a study like this, they come
to the study with an already-formed opinion about the moral reliability of
the criminal justice system. There is a limited amount that a researcher can
do in the context of a study to shift that preexisting view. But despite the
fact that we can only marginally shift subjects’ views of the system, we
nonetheless see a corresponding downward shift in subjects’ willingness to
defer to the criminal justice system.
A follow-up study used a slightly different methodology. Instead of
the “within-subjects design” used in the former study, it used a “betweensubjects design.” That is, instead of asking the same subjects their views
after being “disillusioned” about the criminal justice system, this study
used separate groups. The researchers asked all subjects the same questions
but did not disillusion some subjects, mildly disillusioned other subjects,
and more seriously disillusioned a third group. The study found that the
extent of the disillusionment determined the extent to which the subjects
would defer to the criminal justice system.28

28
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TABLE 4: BETWEEN-SUBJECTS DISILLUSIONMENT STUDY

1. Life Sentence

Baseline: No
Disillusionment

Low
Disillusionment

High
Disillusionment

6.56a

6.59a

5.35b

a

b

5.59b

2. Facebook
3. Financial
Maneuver

6.14

5.38

5.25a

5.16a

4.34b

4. Arrowhead

5.93a

5.65a

4.95b

5. Hand Gun

6.66a

5.40b

4.32c

6. Dog Lover

5.15

a

7. Gas Station

7.05a

6.63a

5.63b

8. Restaurant

7.15a

6.47b

5.84c

4.75

a,b

4.43b

Note: The difference between two figures in the same row is statistically
insignificant if they share the same letter annotation. That is, the difference
between two values within the same row is statistically significant if the
figures are annotated with different letters.

Another study did not collect new data but sought to determine
whether the same dynamic was present in some of the large datasets of
survey data previously collected by others.29 As the table below
demonstrates,30 the moral credibility measure in the study explains more of
the variance in the “willingness to defer” measure than any of the other
measures. In fact, it is the only predictor that is statistically significant.
TABLE 5: WILLINGNESS TO DEFER STUDY
Variable

Willingness to Defer to Criminal Justice System in the Future
Standardized Regression Coefficient

Significance

Moral Credibility

.265

p < .002

Male

–.072

p < .395

Age

–.128

p < .148

White

.062

p < .476

Education

–.134

p < .144

Household Income

.017

p < .859

Married

.167

p < .069

What the studies show is that there is a continuous relationship
between a system’s moral credibility and its ability to gain deference and
compliance. A marginal decrease in credibility produces a marginal
29
30

Robinson et al., supra note 15, at 2016–23.
The table below is reproduced from id. at 2022.
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decrease in deference and compliance. This is an important conclusion
because it gives every society, no matter how bad its criminal justice
system’s reputation, good practical reasons to improve the moral credibility
of its criminal justice system. Even those systems with better reputations
can improve their crime-control effectiveness by further improving their
reputation for justness.
This insight is particularly important because the truth is that no
criminal justice system, no matter how careful it is, can have perfect moral
credibility with every member of the community. This is inevitable in part
because out from the core of wrongdoing, people within a community will
disagree among themselves on some matters. Thus, no matter what position
the criminal code takes, it must risk alienating one group or another. But
for the reasons noted above, there is still crime-control value in trying to
maximize the system’s moral credibility by trying to minimize the
disillusioning effect of these inevitable instances of perceived deviations
from desert.31 It is also worth mentioning that a criminal justice system’s
reputation can be influenced not only by the justness of its adjudication
results but also by the fairness of its adjudication process.32
To summarize, legal rules that deviate from the community’s
judgments of justice are not cost-free, as has generally been assumed in the
past, but rather carry a hidden cost to effective crime control. To be most
effective, the criminal law should, above all else, try to build a reputation
as a reliable moral authority that does justice and avoids injustice. In that

31

When faced with an issue on which there is disagreement within the community, and in trying to
find the position that will alienate the fewest number of people, it will often make sense to adopt the
majority view, but not always. One can imagine a situation in which a minority has very strong feelings
about an issue, while a majority has less strong feelings. In some parts of the U.S., this may be the
situation regarding abortion or same-sex intercourse, for example. In such situations, one may conclude
that the criminal justice system’s moral credibility will be least undermined by adopting the strongly
held view of the significant minority rather than the less strongly held view of the majority.
32
A system and its processes seen as fair will gain greater deference and compliance than those
seen as unfair. While the effect of increased “legitimacy,” as Tom Tyler has labeled it, from greater
procedural fairness and professionalism in policing may not have the power of the system’s increased
credibility in setting the liability and punishment results, it is sufficient to justify setting procedural
fairness and police professionalism as important goals on the grounds of effective crime control. For
further discussions on process legitimacy, see the works of Tom R. Tyler, beginning with his book
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). For a discussion of the similarities and differences and
interactions between procedural fairness and moral credibility in results, see also ROBINSON, IJUD,
supra note 1, at 202–07; Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The
Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
211 (2012).
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way, it can harness the powerful forces of social and normative influence to
gain deference and compliance.33
These findings represent an important change to the classic
punishment-theory debate, which has always seen two irreconcilably
opposed camps. On one side are the retributivists, who urge distributing
punishment in a way that does justice because they see justice as a value in
itself, and therefore it needs no practical justification. On the other side are
the utilitarians, who would distribute punishment so as to avoid future
crime. They believe that punishment can only be justified by its future
crime reduction and, therefore, typically urge the distribution of
punishment to optimize general deterrence or the incapacitation of
dangerous offenders.
These opposing camps would each propose a distribution of
punishment to a different set of people and in different amounts, because
each looks to different criteria. The retributivists, wanting to do justice,
would look to an offender’s moral blameworthiness. The utilitarians, who
want to reduce crime, would look to what would most effectively deter and
incapacitate potential offenders.
Historically, these two camps have been seen as diametrically opposed
and unavoidably in conflict. The two goals—of doing justice or fighting
crime—are seen as naturally in conflict and one must pick between them.
But the empirical desert studies suggest that the picture is actually quite
different. It may be that the best way to fight crime is to do justice.
The superiority of empirical desert as an effective crime-control
strategy comes in part from the fact that an empirical-desert distribution of
liability and punishment necessarily carries with it some general deterrent
effect and some ability to incapacitate dangerous offenders. A just sentence
can have a deterrent effect and provides an opportunity to incapacitate a
dangerous offender. In fact, the only way in which those alternative
distributive principles can do better than empirical desert—the only way
they can provide greater deterrence or greater opportunity to incapacitate—
is by deviating from it—that is, by doing injustice or by failing to do
justice. But it is exactly these deviations from desert that undermine the
system’s moral credibility and, thereby, its crime-control effectiveness.
Thus, any instance of greater deterrent or incapacitation effect purchased
33

For a thoughtful critique, and our response immediately following, see Donald Braman, Dan M.
Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531
(2010); and Paul H. Robinson, Owen D. Jones & Robert Kurzban, Realism, Punishment, and Reform,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1611 (2010). For another critique, see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren BrinkleyRubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L. REV. 77 (2013). Our reply was Robinson et al.,
Empirical Desert, supra note 22.
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by an injustice or a failure of justice can be offset by the damage such
deviation does in reducing the system’s moral credibility. In contrast, an
empirical desert distribution, based as it is upon tracking the community’s
judgments of justice, can gain the crime-control benefits of moral
credibility while maintaining the general deterrent and incapacitation
benefits inherent in such a distribution.
It is important to note, however, that the practical crime-control power
of doing justice is found in distributing criminal liability and punishment
according to rules rooted in the community’s judgments of justice—
“empirical desert”—rather than philosophers’ notions of justice—
“deontological desert.” For it is the effect of empirical desert in building
the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community that has the
beneficial crime-control effect, and that can be achieved only by having
criminal law track the community’s notion of justice, not the philosophers’
notion. And empirical desert is not true justice in a transcendent
deontological sense.
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that, as a practical matter,
empirical desert is in most respects a close approximation of deontological
desert and, given the practical problems with trying to produce a criminal
law based upon deontological desert, empirical desert may be the best and
perhaps the only practical means of adopting a reliable approximation of
deontological desert.34
Thus, criminal law that seeks to control crime should very much care
about what the community thinks is just because to deviate from the
community’s judgments of justice—to deviate from an empirical-desert
distributive principle—undermines the system’s credibility and thereby its
crime-control effectiveness. The greatest deference and compliance from
the citizens will come from a system that commits itself to an empirical
desert distribution. This brings us to our final question, which is whether it
is ever justifiable to deviate from the community’s judgments of justice.
IV.

SHOULD THE CRIMINAL LAW EVER DEVIATE FROM THE COMMUNITY’S
SHARED JUDGMENTS OF JUSTICE?

Even if there is value in tracking community views, should criminal
law sometimes deviate from them? If so, when? That is, might one ever be
justified in deciding that the criminal law should adopt a rule even though it
is known to conflict with community views of justice?

34

For more detailed discussion of the issue, see ROBINSON, IJUD, supra note 1, at 172–74; and
Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and
Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2007).
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The answer to this question may depend upon why one is adopting a
criminal law based upon community views. If it is solely out of a
commitment to democratic ideals, then perhaps the community view should
always prevail. If one supports adopting the community view because it
generally reflects the blameworthiness of the offender rather than utilitarian
crime-control programs of deterrence and incapacitation of the
dangerous—that is, because it is the best practical approximation of
deontological desert—then again, one might be hesitant to deviate from
those community views of justice.
However, if one supports a criminal law based upon community views
because of its crime-control potential in harnessing the powerful forces of
social and normative influence, then logically one ought to be open to
having criminal law deviate from community views if, by doing so, one
could get a crime-control benefit that exceeds the crime-control cost of the
deviation. The good crime-control utilitarian would presumably simply run
the numbers: one could justify doing injustice or a failure of justice, as the
community sees it, if such would produce such a large deterrent or
incapacitative crime-control benefit as to outweigh the crime-control cost
of reduced moral credibility.
However, there is reason to be skeptical that this will regularly occur.
While general deterrence works in theory, research suggests that it is the
exception rather than the rule that one can increase the criminal law’s
deterrent effect by manipulating criminal law rules. The problem is that the
intended targets of the deterrence program, the potential offenders,
commonly do not know of the criminal law rules that have been formulated
to maximize deterrence. And even if they did know the rules, this target
population frequently is irrational; they are not rational calculators who
will weigh the costs and benefits of their conduct. Rather, they commonly
are subject to drug abuse, alcoholism, mental illness, impulsiveness, gang
influence, and so forth. And even if the potential offender knows the
criminal law rule and is a rational calculator, he commonly will see the
benefits of crime as outweighing the risks. This is in large part because the
conviction and punishment rate for offenses is so low as to create little real
risk that the planned offense will be punished. And, indeed, it is not even
the actual risks of being caught and punished that matter but the risks
perceived by the target audience. The target audience that regularly
underestimates the risk of punishment, as is commonly the case, can
destroy a deterrence program.35

35

For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES, supra
note 23, at chs. 3–4.
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With regard to deviations from community views in order to
incapacitate potentially dangerous offenders, there is little doubt that such
preventive detention can avoid future crime. An incapacitation distributive
principle does not suffer the ineffectiveness difficulties of a general
deterrence principle. However, as I have discussed in more detail
elsewhere,36 the current state of the clinical sciences, such as a poor
predictive ability and a serious problem of false positives, makes such a
system costly both in terms of administrative costs and its intrusions on
personal liberties for the false positives. Perhaps more importantly, so
openly substituting pure preventive detention for criminal justice would
destroy the system’s moral credibility—it would make it clear that the
system is simply not in the justice business—and therefore would lose
access to the powerful forces of social and normative influence that moral
credibility would bring.
It is perhaps no surprise, then, to see that current practice, to the extent
that it tries to engage such preventive detention measures, does so while
cloaking those measures as if they were criminal justice. However, the
distortions required for such cloaking dramatically undermine the
effectiveness of the preventive detention project. It turns out that both
society and potential detainees would be better off if preventive detention,
if done at all, were done openly in a civil commitment system disconnected
from criminal justice.
While I see little justification for deviating from community views in
order to promote effective crime control, let me suggest two situations in
which deviation might be appropriate.
First, as noted above, community judgments of justice—empirical
desert—are not the same as true justice in a transcendent sense—what one
might call deontological desert. The community could be wrong about what
constitutes justice, as we have seen in the slaveholding South in the U.S.
prior to the Civil War, for example. Another example is the discriminatory
treatment of women in our own history (and continuing in many societies
today). We as a society may hold views today that people fifty years from
now will look upon as appalling. Today’s empirical desert can be wrong.
If today’s community is blind to the injustice of some criminal law
rule, the law ought to deviate from those community views. The problem,
of course, is how are we to know this if the community fails to see the
injustice. There seems no reliable mechanism by which the many claims of
injustice can be screened to determine those few that might stand the test of
36

For more detailed discussion of these issues, see id. at ch. 6; and Paul H. Robinson, Punishing
Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).

1590

111:1565 (2017)

Challenge of Social Change

time. What one can say, however, is that a society ought to be constantly
vigilant in testing its current criminal law to determine whether its rules are
producing unappreciated injustices.
One final reason to deviate from community views is likely to be more
common, and more important. It is sometimes the case that government or
social leaders can see a need to change community norms regarding a
particular practice or conduct. In the United States, for example, over the
past several decades people’s views have shifted on the condemnability of
such things as insider trading, domestic violence, drunk driving,
downloading music without a license, and date rape. Social and political
reformers have seen these shifts in public attitudes as important to the
creation of a better society. But if criminal law is always to follow the
community’s current judgments of justice, then how can law play a role in
helping to bring changes in community views? If empirical desert is the
distributive principle, it would seem to condemn criminal law to be always
a follower of public opinion, never a leader.
Certainly, if community views change, then criminal law can and
should change with it. But must criminal law always be a follower? Can
criminal law sometimes be used to help bring about changes in the
community’s judgments about what is condemnable? The criminal law
certainly could be effective in doing this. By more broadly criminalizing
certain conduct or by increasing the penalties assigned to it, the criminal
law can signal to citizens that they ought to think of such conduct as being
more condemnable than they had previously thought it.
But using criminal law to change community views creates
complications for empirical desert.37 If empirical desert is attractive as a
distributive principle because, by tracking community views, it can earn a
reputation as being a reliable moral authority and can inspire greater
deference to its commands and greater internalization of its norms,38 then if
the law conflicts with community views—by being out in front of public
views—it can lose its crime-control effectiveness because it might come to
be seen as an unreliable and unjust distributor of punishment.
Thus, whenever criminal law seeks to be a leader of community
views, it must worry that such deviation risks undermining its moral
credibility. American Prohibition in the 1920s illustrates the problem.
Because of a combination of political forces, a constitutional amendment
was passed that prohibited the sale of alcohol in the United States, even
though only a minority of Americans actually supported such
37
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criminalization. The law was thus seen by most citizens as criminalizing
conduct that was not sufficiently condemnable to be treated as criminal.
The result was an alcohol ban that was famously ignored. Americans
continued to make and drink alcohol, which brought them into conflict with
the criminal law. What is most interesting in this historical episode is that
citizens increasingly ignored not only the criminal law ban on alcohol but
also criminal law’s other prohibitions. Crime rates increased, even for
offenses unrelated to the use, sale, or manufacture of alcohol. The criminal
law’s loss of moral credibility with the community undermined its crimecontrol effectiveness generally.
This is exactly as the reasoning underlying empirical desert would
predict. As the criminal law pressed its prohibition on alcohol despite the
fact that a majority of the community did not see alcohol as sufficiently
condemnable to be criminal, the criminal law’s reputation with the
community suffered. People could reason that if the criminal law could be
so wrong about the condemnability of alcohol use, perhaps it was also
wrong about some of the other things that it prohibits. In 1933, Prohibition
was repealed and the criminal law began to heal its injured reputation.39
Prohibition nicely illustrates the dangers for any social reformer who
seeks to use criminal law to change community views. If the reformer seeks
to persuade people that certain conduct, such as drunk driving, is really
much more condemnable than they thought, by broadening the prohibition
and the penalties for drunk driving, the legal reform might well be able to
influence community views, and shift them, to have people see drunk
driving as more condemnable. And as the community view shifts, the
conflict between community views and the criminal law disappears, and
with it disappears the danger that a code–community conflict will
undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility. On the other hand, there is
the danger that the criminal law’s attempt to change community views will
be unsuccessful, as it was in Prohibition. And when that happens, the
conflict between community views and the criminal law does not go away
but continues, and continues to undermine the law’s credibility.
Ironically, it is social reformers more than any other group who should
be most anxious to develop and maintain the system’s moral credibility,
because it is that credibility that gives criminal law the power to shift
societal norms. If law lacks moral authority, it can do nothing to change
people’s views. Thus, social reformers ought to consider a general
approach of this sort: In regard to most issues, have criminal law maximize
its moral credibility with the community by carefully following existing
39

1592

For a detailed discussion of the Prohibition, see ROBINSON, PIRATES, supra note 12, at ch. 8.

111:1565 (2017)

Challenge of Social Change

community views so as to build its reputation as a reliable moral authority.
Once that reputation has been established—once the criminal law has
earned “moral credibility chips” with the community—reformers can
carefully and selectively “spend” those chips by having law criminalize or
punish more severely the conduct about which it seeks to change
community views. The legal change will signal to the community that they
should see the conduct as more condemnable, and the law’s credibility will
induce citizens to accept and internalize this view. If the reform is
successful in changing people’s views, then the gap between the criminal
law and community views will disappear and the reform can be
consolidated. If the effort is not successful in changing people’s views, then
the effort should be abandoned before the conflict between community
views and the criminal law brings the criminal law into disrepute.
To be clear, there is no problem with social reformers seeking to
change community views through means other than criminal law reform.
There is no damage to criminal law—no undermining of its moral
credibility—if social reformers use mechanisms such as advertising,
education, governmental proclamation, or any other mechanism to
influence people.
Let me offer one last piece of advice to social reformers who are
hoping to change community views on the condemnability of specific
conduct: not all community judgments about what should be criminal can
be effectively altered.40 Some judgments are so deep-seated as to be
essentially immune to attempts to change them. This is probably true of
people’s judgments that serious wrongdoing should be condemned and
punished and people’s view that the core of criminality—physical
aggression, taking of property without consent, and deceit in exchanges—is
condemnable. As noted above, there is good evidence to suggest that
people’s judgments on such matters are the product of a partially innate
predisposition as a result of evolutionary development; they are not
something that can be educated or coerced out of people’s thinking.41
The immutability of people’s judgments about the core of wrongdoing
does provide an interesting insight that reformers might usefully exploit:
reformers can increase their ability to have people see some conduct as
deservedly criminal if they can build up in people’s minds the strength of
the analogy between that conduct and the core of wrongdoing. For
example, there has been a major effort by companies and artists who
produce music, movies, or books to persuade people that they should not
40
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download such materials without a proper license. People used to think of
such downloading as being primarily a technical violation of copyright law,
not truly condemnable conduct. But the public campaign to change those
views has been somewhat successful, and the most successful part of it has
been a publicity campaign that seeks to build the analogy to core
wrongdoing with images of a musician having money taken from his
pocket—an attempt to visually build the analogy between downloading
without a license and physical theft.
To summarize, one can justify deviations from community views
when using criminal law to help change societal norms, but such use is
possible only if a system has earned moral credibility by generally adhering
to empirical desert as a distributive principle and is wise only if used
occasionally, selectively, and carefully.
CONCLUSION
Distributing criminal liability and punishment according to rules based
upon the community’s judgments of justice can be attractive for purely
democratic reasons. It also may be attractive because an “empirical desert”
distribution may be the most feasible best approximation of “deontological
desert”—justice in some broader transcendent sense as moral philosophers
would define it. But what may be most striking about empirical desert as a
distributive principle is that it ought also to be attractive to crime-control
utilitarians. Because empirical desert will, essentially by definition, be seen
as the most just of all distributive principles, it has the ability to harness the
powerful forces of social and normative influence.
Having earned such moral credibility, the criminal justice system can
reduce resistance and subversion; can increase assistance, cooperation, and
acquiescence; can engage the powerful yet inexpensive mechanism of
stigmatization; can reduce the likelihood of vigilantism; can gain greater
compliance in borderline cases of conduct whose condemnability is
unsettled; and, perhaps most importantly, can increase its ability to have
community members internalize its norms.
But the proper place of community views is in the creation of legal
rules, not in the adjudication of individual cases. Lay judgments in
individual cases can be distorted by biases, consciously or otherwise, that
even the laypersons themselves would agree ought to play no role in
distributing punishment. These biases can be isolated when social
psychologists test lay judgments of justice, but cannot be effectively
controlled when the community is asked to directly judge an individual
case. Further, a system based upon a codified set of liability and
punishment rules will produce greater uniformity in application and,
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therefore, greater moral credibility in the long term, than a system of ad hoc
adjudication.
Once the criminal law has earned a reputation as a reliable moral
authority, it can “spend” those moral credibility “chips” in trying to lead
rather than follow community views on selective issues. But reformers
must be ready to pull back if the reform efforts are not successful, in order
to avoid damaging its reputation for justice and thereby endangering its
effectiveness as an engine of reform in the future. Reformers should also
avoid wasting their hard-earned chips by spending them on attempts to
modify community views that are simply not malleable. It would be a
hopeless and wasteful exercise, for example, to try to persuade the
community that they should not want serious wrongdoing to be punished,
as many modern punishment abolitionists seek to do.
Social reformers are encouraged to use any number of other
institutions of social influence to shape community views, including
schools, social media, religious organizations, community activism, and the
political process. And whatever community judgments of justice are
changed by these processes, the criminal law should be careful to follow if
it is to maintain its reputation for justness.
To conclude, the available evidence suggests not that community
judgments of justice are an endless collection of individual disagreements
but that there is strong agreement on a core of issues regarding the relative
blameworthiness of a wide range of offenses and offenders. And those
shared judgments of justice are not brutish and draconian, but rather stand
in stark contrast to the brutish and draconian measures created by the
modern coercive crime-control doctrines of general deterrence and
incapacitation of the dangerous, which disconnect criminal law from the
constraints of justice. That disconnection, in the name of effective crime
control, reflects a failure to appreciate the crime-control cost of criminal
law’s conflicts with community judgments of justice. Such evidence should
influence criminal law reformers to attempt to firmly connect the criminal
law to community judgments of justice.
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